Move and accommodate: A solution to Haddock's puzzle by Champollion, Lucas & Sauerland, Uli
Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics 8
O. Bonami & P. Cabredo Hofherr (eds.) 2011, pp. 27–51
http://www.cssp.cnrs.fr/eiss8
Move and accommodate:
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Lucas Champollion and Uli Sauerland∗
1 Introduction
What licenses the use of a definite description? The formal and philosophical litera-
ture has approached this question in two ways. The uniqueness approach (Frege, 1892;
Russell, 1905; Strawson, 1950) holds that we may use a definite determiner only if the
property denoted by its complement holds of exactly one individual in some domain:
Sentence (1) and (2) can only be true if there is exactly one king of France, and exactly
one American governor, respectively. Since this is not the case in the actual world, the
sentences are either false or (on most modern accounts) fall prey to a presupposition
failure.
(1) The king of France is bald.
(2) Today, the American governor appeared on TV.
The familiarity approach (Christophersen, 1939; Heim, 1982; Groenendijk and Stokhof,
1991) holds that definite descriptions are anaphoric to a discourse referent that is al-
ready in the discourse context: A discourse like (3) is felicitous even given that there
is more than one doctor in the universe. Within the familiarity approaches, Roberts
(2003) contrasts the notions of strong familiarity, which usually involves explicit previ-
ous mention of the entity in question, and weak familiarity, where its existence need
only be entailed in the linguistic or nonlinguistic context, for example on the basis of
perceptually accessed information.
(3) There’s a doctor in our little town. The doctor is Welsh. Roberts (2003)
Many actual accounts fall somewhere in the spectrum between the uniqueness and
the familiarity approach. For example, Schwarz (2009) argues on independent grounds
that there are two types of definites in natural language, and that each of them is char-
acterized by one of the approaches mentioned.
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This paper discusses the use of embedded definites, or definite descriptions embed-
ded in other definite descriptions, such as the following:
(4) a. the circle in the square
b. the rabbit in the hat Haddock (1987)
c. the lady with the dog Meier (2003)
Embedded definites pose a problem for all the approaches mentioned. On the unique-
ness approach, they pose a problem because their uniqueness presupposition is wea-
ker than expected. For example, it is possible to utter (5) in a context that contains
more than one square. The sentence comes out as true in Fig. 1.
(5) The circle in the square is white.
Figure 1: The basic example
Haddock’s puzzle, as we will refer to it, consists in the fact that the inner definite the
square does not introduce a presupposition to the effect that there is only one square
(Haddock, 1987). We would expect such a presupposition because in general, definite
determiners introduce uniqueness presuppositions on their syntactic complements
and do not take surrounding material into account. For example, it is odd to utter any
of the sentences in (6) in the context of Fig. 1. This is expected if the uniqueness pre-
suppositions of the are computed with respect to their complements only. Otherwise,
these sentences should be acceptable, because Fig. 1 contains exactly one circle in a
square, exactly one small circle, and exactly one square on the right.
(6) a. The circle is in the square.
b. The circle is small.
c. The square is on the right.
Embedded definites also pose a problem for the familiarity approach. First, sentences
like (5) can be uttered with respect to situations like Fig. 1 without any previous talk of
circles and squares. This is unexpected under the strong familiarity approach, which
requires that the referents of definite descriptions have been previously mentioned.
The weak familiarity approach may look at first sight like it fares better, because it holds
that definite descriptions are licensed whose referent is known by the extralinguistic
context alone. But, like all other approaches, it too fails to account for the contrast
between (5) and the sentences in (6), since Fig. 1 provides potential referents for the
definite descriptions in all these sentences.
The problem for both approaches is compounded by the fact that even embedded
definites introduce presuppositions. While sentence (5) is acceptable in Fig. 1 above,
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it is unacceptable in Fig. 2 below. The only difference between the two figures is the
addition of a second circle-in-a-square pair. Apparently, sentence (5) introduces the
presupposition that there is exactly one nested circle-in-a-square pair. This presup-
position seems to arise from an interaction of the two definite descriptions, which is
unexpected and problematic on either approach. Higginbotham (2006) playfully re-
ferred to the challenge of accounting for this interaction as “the simplest hard problem
I know”.
Figure 2: The scene from Fig. 1, with an additional nested circle-in-a-square shape
The claim of this paper is that embedded definites can, despite the appearances,
be accounted for on the uniqueness approach. Far from being a surprise, we argue
that the behavior of embedded definites is actually expected once two independent
facts are taken into account: the ability of noun phrases to take scope, i.e., to be in-
terpreted in a different place from their syntactic position, and the interaction of pre-
suppositions and scope-taking elements. Specifically, we analyze embedded definites
as a case of inverse linking (Gabbay and Moravscik, 1974; May, 1977): the embedded
definite takes scope over the embedding one. The presupposition of the embedded
definite is weakened as a result of the independently motivated process of intermedi-
ate accommodation (Kratzer, 1989; Berman, 1991). In our case, this process transfers
the presupposition of the embedding definite into the restrictor of the embedded one.
Like other scope-taking processes, inverse linking is generally taken to be subject
to locality constraints: if a syntactic island, such as a finite clause boundary, inter-
venes in the path of a scope-taking element, then the resulting reading is unavailable
or degraded (Rodman, 1976). Since our account views embedded definites as cases of
inverse linking, we predict that inserting an island into an embedded definite, all else
being equal, should lead to a similar degradation. We report results from an online
survey with 800 participants that confirm this prediction.
2 The Proposal
This section motivates and spells out our solution to Haddock’s puzzle. We start from
a naïve account of definites that implements the standard uniqueness approach and
fails on embedded definites such as (5). We then add a simple implementation of inter-
mediate accommodation and demonstrate how it correctly derives weakened presup-
positions for embedded definites. Finally, we show that intermediate accommodation
does not interfere with the interpretation of nonembedded definites such as (6).
We adopt a semantic notion of presupposition, according to which sentences have
presuppositions that are compositionally computed from the denotations of their lexi-
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cal items, in tandem with their assertions. The framework we use is fairly standard (see
e.g. Karttunen and Peters, 1979; Muskens, 1996); an accessible introduction is found in
Heim and Kratzer (1998). Sentences are interpreted as pairs of propositions: an asser-
tion and a global presupposition, which is the conjunction of all the presuppositions
provided by the lexical items in the sentence. Sentences whose global presupposition
is true have the same truth value as their assertion; sentences where it is false lack a
truth value. Denotations of lexical items that carry a presupposition are represented as
partial functions that are undefined whenever this lexical presupposition is false. We
write λx :ϕ .ψ for the partial function that is defined for all x such that its lexical pre-
supposition ϕ holds, and that returns ψ wherever the function is defined. We write ∃!
for the generalized quantifier exactly one. The term ιx R(x) denotes the unique indi-
vidual x such that R(x) holds, and fails to denote if there is either no or more than one
such individual (Hilbert and Bernays, 1939). With these conventions, the denotation
of the word the can be represented as follows:
(7) the = λR : [∃!x R(x)]. [ιx R(x)]
What (7) says is that the word the is translated as a partial function which is defined on
any predicate R that applies to exactly one entity, and that this partial function returns
the unique entity of which R holds.
In such a framework, the challenge consists in deriving the presuppositions of both
embedded and non-embedded definites in a compositional way. Consider first the
baseline case, a nonembedded sentence. Sentence (6a), repeated here as (8), presup-
poses that there exist exactly one circle and exactly one square.1
(8) The circle is in the square.
This presupposition is straightforwardly derived with the standard syntax and lexicon
given in Fig. 3.
S
DP
The circle
VP
is PP
in DP
the square
Word Translation
the λR : [∃!x R(x)]. [ιx R(x)]
circle λx.circle(x)
is λP.P
in λy.λx.in(x, y)
square λx.square(x)
Presupposition: [∃!x circle(x)]∧ [∃!y square(y)]
Assertion: in([ιx circle(x)], [ιy square(y)])
Figure 3: The naïve account illustrated on nonembedded definites.
1This and all other presuppositions have to be relativized to the given context, to avoid presupposi-
tion failure due to shapes which are not shown in our pictures. Any implementation of the uniqueness
approach must take this relativization into account somehow. We will largely ignore this issue in the
following, since it is orthogonal to the phenomenon of embedded definites.
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The formalization described so far models a naïve version of the uniqueness ap-
proach. Given the discussion in Sect. 1, it is unsurprising that it fails for embedded
definites. For example, sentence (5), repeated below as (9), is incorrectly predicted to
presuppose that there is exactly one square, and that this square is contained in exactly
one circle. This prediction is illustrated in Fig. 4, which uses a standard syntax and the
same lexicon as before; the word white is translated as λx.white(x). As we have seen,
the predicted presupposition is too strong: sentence (9) is acceptable in Fig. 1, even
though there is more than one square in that figure.2
(9) The circle in the square is white.
The problem is a consequence of an assumption left implicit in the naïve account: it
was assumed that the semantic contribution (in this case, the uniqueness presuppo-
sition) of a definite determiner is determined exclusively by its complement. This as-
sumption may have seemed justified in the case of nonembedded definites, but it can
no longer be maintained. Rather, embedded definites force us to conclude that defi-
nite determiners make their semantic contribution in the context of the entire clause
in which they appear. As we will see in Sect. 3, this fact has been recognized, but not
explained, by previous authors.
We propose an explanation from a novel angle: Insofar as definite determiners act
semantically on their clause rather than just on their complements, they are analogous
to quantificational determiners (Barwise and Cooper, 1981). Based on this parallel, the
null assumption is to expect definite and quantificational determiners to share other
properties too, for example as regards their interaction with presuppositions. Specifi-
cally, we expect definite determiners to exhibit intermediate presupposition accommo-
dation as quantificational determiners do. We use intermediate accommodation as
a descriptive term for the phenomenon in which the presuppositions of the nuclear
scope of a quantificational determiner are optionally accommodated into its restrictor
(Kratzer, 1989; Berman, 1991).3 For example, (10) displays intermediate accommoda-
tion because it quantifies only over those men that have a wife, rather than presuppos-
ing that every man has a wife.4
(10) Every man loves his wife. (van der Sandt, 1992)
The constraints on the availability of intermediate accommodation are not well un-
derstood. For example, von Fintel (1994), Sect. 2.4.3, offers examples illustrating that
intermediate accommodation of the presuppositions supplied by definites is, in his
words, “far from automatic”. In the following, we will not attempt to model the con-
straints on intermediate accommodation of presuppositions supplied by definites. We
base our claim on the fact that such accommodation is sometimes if not always pos-
2We assume that the predicates denoted by circle and in the square are conjoined via a predicate
modification rule (see e.g. Heim and Kratzer, 1998) and that the result of this rule inherits the lexical
presuppositions of the conjuncts.
3Intermediate accommodation is called local accommodation by some authors, e.g. von Fintel
(1994). This is potentially confusing because the term local accommodation is used in most other work
to refer to a separate phenomenon in which the presupposition is added to the assertive content of the
nuclear scope, rather than the restrictor.
4See Beaver (2001) and Chemla (2009) for further discussion of similar examples.
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S
DP
The NP
circle PP
in DP
the square
VP
is white
Presupposition: [∃!x circle(x)∧ in(x, ιy square(y))] ∧ [∃!y square(y)]
Assertion: white([ιx circle(x)∧ in(x, ιy square(y))])
Figure 4: The naïve account makes the wrong prediction for embedded definites.
sible, and therefore must be made available in principle by any formal account. The
following attested example illustrates this fact, and shows that the presuppositions of
definites can be accommodated intermediately in the same syntactic configuration as
that of embedded definites.
(11) On enlistment, the wife of every soldier receives from the government a sepa-
ration allowance of $20 a month, recently increased to $25 a month.5
The highlighted noun phrase in (11) can be paraphrased as the wife of every married
soldier. In other words, the restrictor of every is evaluated only with respect to those
soldiers x for which the presupposition of the wife of x is satisfied. As a whole, (11)
does not have the presupposition that every soldier has a wife. This is exactly what in-
termediate accommodation predicts, provided that the nuclear scope of every contains
the term that corresponds to the wife of x and that this term projects a presupposition.
We will now extend our account to represent the scopal and presuppositional be-
havior of quantifiers exhibited by the last example. For this purpose, we equip our syn-
tactic trees with a scope-shifting operation: Quantifier raising (QR) replaces quantifiers
with a coindexed trace, and adjoins them at the closest node of type t (May, 1977; Heim
and Kratzer, 1998). The trace is interpreted as a variable that is bound by the quantifier,
and it does not introduce any presuppositions. Example (11) and other constructions
we are concerned with are cases of inverse linking, that is, a quantificational deter-
miner takes syntactic scope in the restrictor of another one but takes semantic scope
over it. Inverse linking configurations have been variously analyzed as involving ad-
junction of the quantifier at either S (May 1977; Sauerland 2005 and others) or DP (e.g.
May 1985; Barker 2001; see also Charlow 2009). Our analysis is compatible with either
assumption. For concreteness, we assume here that quantifiers adjoin at S. This also
simplifies the presentation, since adjoining at DP would require adjusting the type of
the quantifier (Heim and Kratzer, 1998).
5Source: Sir Hebert Ames, Canada’s War Relief Work. The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 1918, 79: 44. Available online through books.google.com.
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As a stand-in for a more elaborate model of intermediate accommodation, we ad-
opt a simple mechanism that applies after QR and that operates directly on logical
subformulas. Our mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 5, which models a simplified ver-
sion of (11). Following von Fintel (1994) and others, we assume that all determiners
contain a free and uniquely named variable C ,C ′, . . . which ranges over subformulas
and which is interpreted conjunctively with the complement of the determiner. For
example, everyC is interpreted as λRλN [∀x (R(x)∧C )→ N (x)]. When the sister node
of a quantificational noun phrase whose free variable is C imposes a presuppositionϕ,
then C may optionally resolve to ϕ. In this case, ϕ is not added to the global presup-
position of the sentence.6 Otherwise, C is trivially resolved to true. If C is resolved to a
formulaϕ that contains a variable which is free inϕ, we allow this variable to be bound
from outside C . That is, the variable is not renamed, in contrast to beta reduction. This
avoids the binding problem discussed by Karttunen and Peters (1979). As an example,
in Fig. 5, the variable x introduced by the trace is free within C , but after presuppo-
sition accommodation it is bound by the quantifier introduced by every soldier. This
treatment of intermediate accommodation is perhaps not very elegant, but it is not our
concern here to provide a theory of intermediate accommodation per se. We adopt it
here because it is simple and does not distract from our main goal. We leave it for
future work to decide whether our account of embedded definites is compatible with
attempts to reduce intermediate accommodation to independent principles, such as
contextual domain restriction (von Fintel, 1994, 2006; Beaver, 2001, 2004) or anaphora
resolution (van der Sandt, 1992; Geurts, 1999).
DP1
everyC soldier
S
DP
The NP
wife of t1
VP
gets an allowance
Presupposition: none
Assertion: [∀x (soldier(x) ∧ C )→ gets-an-allowance(ιy wife-of(y, x))]
where C = [∃!y wife-of(y, x)] — i.e., x is married
Figure 5: Intermediate accommodation in inverse linking: “The wife of every soldier
gets an allowance”
Because of the parallels between definites and other quantifiers mentioned earlier,
we assume that QR can apply to definite descriptions, and that they too contain a free
variable C which can be resolved by intermediate accommodation. The assumption
6A more elaborate treatment may well add something similar to ϕ to the global presupposition even
then. The question of exactly what is presupposed by a sentence with intermediate accommodation is
controversial (Beaver, 2001; Singh, 2008).
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that QR can apply to definites is independently motivated in accounts that assign def-
inites the same type as quantifiers (e.g. Isac 2006), since QR is one strategy to resolve
type mismatches of quantifiers in non-subject positions (though a type-shifting strat-
egy is another option, see Heim and Kratzer 1998). However, our proposal is equally
compatible with referential accounts of definites in the tradition of Frege (1892) and
Strawson (1950) in which definites map predicates to individuals, as was implicitly as-
sumed for example (7). In such accounts, we assume that QR can apply to definites to
prevent presupposition failure.
Table 1 shows our entries for each account. In both cases, R stands for the predi-
cate supplied by the complement of the. As in the case of quantifiers, the variable C is
interpreted conjunctively with that predicate. On the quantificational account, R is a
mnemonic for restrictor and N for nuclear scope. To simplify the discussion, we will
refer to R as the restrictor as we discuss both accounts, even though this terminology
is strictly speaking not appropriate in the case of the referential account.
Word Translation
theC (referential) λR : [∃!x R(x)∧C ]. [ιx R(x)∧C ]
theC (quantificational) λR : [∃!x R(x)∧C ]. [λN . N (ιx R(x)∧C )]
Table 1: Proposed lexical entries for the on referential and quantificational accounts.
We can now formally model our explanation of Haddock’s puzzle. The account as
presented predicts that the presupposition of an embedded definite is weaker than
that of a regular definite. The reason for this is that QR applies to the embedded def-
inite. Since it takes scope above the embedding definite, the presupposition of that
definite is accommodated into the restrictor of the embedded definite. Note that C in
the lexical entries in Table 1 appears in the scope of the iota operator. So C resolved
nontrivially (i.e. if intermediate accommodation takes place), the result is a weaker
uniqueness presupposition than otherwise. This fact is the key to understanding why
the presuppositions of embedded definites are weakened.7
Fig. 6 illustrates the application of our account to our example (5). QR raises the
inner definite, the square, above the rest of the sentence, which imposes the presup-
position “there is exactly one circle in x” on the referent of the trace. The C variable of
the raised definite is resolved to that presupposition.8 As a consequence, that presup-
position is not added to the global presuppositions of the sentence. After resolving C ,
7We are agnostic about whether this free variable C should also be used to account for the general
context dependency of determiners and quantifiers mentioned in footnote 1, as in von Fintel (1994). If
it turns out that C also plays this role, then this provides further motivation for the entries we propose
in Table 1.
8The outer definite also contains a variable, call it C ′, but we omit it from the picture for clarity. Here
is why this has no consequences for the predictions we make. The nuclear scope of the outer definite,
is white, does not have any (relevant) presuppositions, so no intermediate accommodation takes place
and C ′ gets resolved trivially. The outer definite stays in situ because there is no reason for it to move. On
a quantificational account, this can be explained due to the absence of a type mismatch. On a referential
account, movement can be seen as a strategy to repair presupposition failures, therefore there is no
reason to do so in the contexts we consider. Whether the reading that would result from moving the
outer definite is available is a question we do not consider in this paper.
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the presupposition of the raised definite is weakened from “the number of squares is
exactly one” to “the number of squares that contain exactly one circle is exactly one”.
Since there are no other determiners that could accommodate it, this surfaces as a
global presupposition, i.e., the sentence will only have a truth value in models that sat-
isfy it. In such a model, let x be the square that contains exactly one circle, and let y
be the circle contained in x. The assertion of the sentence is that y is white. We see
that our account correctly predicts that embedded definites have weakened presup-
positions.9
DP1
theC square
S
DP
The NP
circle PP
in t1
VP
is white
Global presupposition: [∃!x square(x)∧C ]
Assertion: is-white([ιy circle(y)∧ in(y, [ιx square(x) ∧ C ])])
where C = [∃!z circle(z)∧ in(z, x)]
Figure 6: Embedded definites: “The circle in the square is white”
In the process of extending the naïve account, we have added two new devices to
it: QR and intermediate accommodation. We now show that the extended account still
makes the right predictions for nonembedded definites. Such cases are illustrated by
our baseline sentence (6a), repeated here as (12). Note that (12) is not a case of inverse
linking: the two noun phrases are not nested.
(12) The circle is in the square.
We have seen in Fig. 3 above that the naïve account predicts the correct presupposi-
tion for (12). That presupposition is shown in (13). It is obtained by conjoining the
presuppositions supplied by the two definite descriptions.
(13) [∃!x circle(x)]∧ [∃!y square(y)]
In our extended account, QR and intermediate accommodation are available. QR by
itself does not change the presuppositions and truth conditions of (12), no matter how
often we apply it: the two definite descriptions are scopally commutative, and the C
9As noted by a member of the CSSP conference audience, it is not clear whether the presupposition of
(9) is indeed “the number of squares that contain exactly one circle is exactly one” or the slightly stronger
“the number of squares that contain at least one circle is exactly one”. This latter presupposition fails in
a picture in which one square contains one circle and another square contains two circles. The account
presented in the running text predicts the former presupposition. We leave this question for future work.
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variables make no contribution because they are resolved trivially. By contrast, inter-
mediate accommodation has the potential to change the overall presupposition. Nev-
ertheless, it turns out that will not result in a different global presupposition. Consider
first the case where QR has not applied. Since the lower definite description the square
does not itself contain any embedded presuppositional items, its presupposition is not
affected by intermediate accommodation, so it comes out as [∃!y square(y)]. As for the
presupposition of the higher definite, it starts out as [∃!x circle(x)∧C ]. If intermediate
accommodation applies, C is resolved to the presupposition of the lower definite. The
result is (14), which is truth-conditionally equivalent to (13).
(14) [∃!x circle(x)∧ [∃!y square(y)]]
Now suppose QR is applied one or more times. No matter how often it is applied, one
of the definites will end up in the syntactic scope of the other one. QR does not affect
presuppositions, so if the order of the definites is the same as before QR, intermedi-
ate accommodation will once again result in the presupposition (14). If QR inverts the
order of the definites, intermediate accommodation will result in the presupposition
(15), which again is equivalent to (13). This explains why only inverse linking configu-
rations result in weakened presuppositions.
(15) [∃!y square(y)∧ [∃!x circle(x)]]
3 Comparison with Previous Accounts
In this section, we evaluate previous accounts of the problem of embedded definites.
Haddock (1987) proposes a solution based on incremental processing; van Eijck (1993)
models regular and embedded definites in a dynamic framework; and Meier (2003) ar-
gues that embedded definites are predicative and therefore devoid of presuppositions.
Superficially, our proposal might look needlessly complicated because it relies on the-
ories of the effects of QR and intermediate accommodation, which are not considered
in the work reviewed in this section. We wish to emphasize, however, that these effects
are well attested independently of embedded definites. So any accurate theory of lan-
guage as a whole will of necessity predict them in some way. Our account simply relies
on the null assumption, which is that these effects also occur in embedded definites.
3.1 Haddock (1987)
Haddock (1987) views the phenomenon of definiteness in a computational setting;
the problem he considers is to parse embedded definites incrementally and to iden-
tify their referents on the fly. His solution to this problem is expressed in Combina-
tory Categorial Grammar (see e.g. Steedman 2000), a formalism that is well suited for
incremental left-to-right evaluation. Semantic representations consist of constraints
on variables and are built up incrementally in tandem with parsing. Each word con-
tributes a constraint, and the syntactic rules specify how variables introduced by dif-
ferent words have equal referents. Simplifying somewhat, parsing a nested definite like
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the circle in the square generates the following representation:10
(16) unique(e1) ; circle(e1) ; in(e1,e2) ; unique(e2) ; square(e2)
This representation is thought of as being interpreted incrementally against a model
by entertaining a candidate set of referents for each variable and successively narrow-
ing it down. For example, when circle(e1) is first introduced, the candidate set of e1
contains all the circles in the model, but by the time all the constraints in (16) have
been processed, the candidate set of e1 contains only those circles that are contained
in a square. The constraint unique(en) is a meta-constraint: it is true if and only if the
candidate set for its variable is a singleton set. Unlike the other constraints, which are
evaluated as soon as the words that generate them are read, Haddock stipulates that
unique(en) is only evaluated “when the NP corresponding to the variable en is syntac-
tically closed”. In left-to-right evaluation, the inner and the outer NP of a nested defi-
nite are both closed at the same time, so the uniqueness constraints are both checked
simultaneously, after all the other constraints in (16) have been processed.
Besides identifying the problem and realizing that the embedded definite is influ-
enced by the larger embedding definite, the merits of Haddock (1987) consist in im-
proving on previous computational treatments of definite reference, which would fail
to find referents for embedded definites.11 However, this early account does not pro-
vide any insight as to why there should be a contrast between embedded definites (9)
and their nonembedded counterparts illustrated in (6). The system in Haddock (1987)
models this contrast by requiring that the uniqueness constraints of definites are eval-
uated exactly at the time the NP that contains them has been processed entirely, rather
than later. From a theoretical point of view, one would want to find an explanation for
such a requirement, and not just stipulate it.
3.2 Van Eijck (1993)
In van Eijck (1993), embedded definites are analyzed only in passing as an example
of the context dependency of the uniqueness presupposition of definite descriptions.
The main purpose of his article is to propose semantic representations for definite and
indefinite descriptions in a framework based on dynamic predicate logic (DPL, Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof, 1991). When a DPL formula is interpreted, information about the
values of variables is encapsulated in an assignment function that is passed sequen-
tially from one subterm to the next. This allows quantifiers to bind variables intro-
duced by pronouns in subsequent sentences. Predicates are interpreted as checks on
the values of variables. In van Eijck’s system, definites whose uniqueness presuppo-
sition is not met generate errors, implemented as special assignment functions which
prevent the formula from having a truth value. As in the present work, definites are
translated with a uniqueness-presupposing, variable-binding operator written as ι, but
there is a difference. Roughly, while we let ιx : ϕ denote an individual, namely the
10Haddock’s actual example uses the noun phrase the rabbit in the hat and has been adapted here.
11We were not able to consult Haddock (1988). As quoted in Dale and Haddock (1991), this work
introduces the important observation that we can avoid an infinite regress in modeling the truth and
felicity conditions of nested definites if the quantifiers introduced by the determiners are both given
wide scope over the entire noun phrase.
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unique individual x for which ϕ is true, for van Eijck the formula ιx : ϕ has a truth
value: it is true just in case there is exactly one way of assigning a value to x that makes
ϕ true. The translation of our basic example (9), based on van Eijck’s translation of an
analogous sentence, is shown in (17). The semicolon (;) is interpreted as an instruction
to sequentially interpret its left-hand side and then its right-hand side.
(17) ιv1 : (circle(v1) ; ιv2 : (square(v2) ; in(v1, v2))) ; white(v1). van Eijck (1993)
Informally, (17) is interpreted as an instruction to do the following: Pick an entity at
random and call it v1; check that this entity is a circle; pick an entity at random and
call it v2; check that it is a square; make sure v1 is in v2; produce an error if any of the
checks failed; produce an error if any other choice for v1 or v2 would not (!) have led to
an error by now; finally, check if v1 is white. (17) has a truth value if and only if there is
a way to pick v1 and v2 that does not lead to an error, and its truth value is determined
by whether or not the last check succeeds (i.e., whether v1 is white).
Given van Eijck’s system, (17) correctly captures the presupposition and the truth
conditions of the nested definite in (9). However, van Eijck does not give a composi-
tional procedure for translating syntactic structures into formulas. Without adopting
an approach similar to ours, it is difficult to see how such a procedure could be given
that would translate the syntax tree in Fig. 4 into the DPL formula (17). As we have seen
in Fig. 4, the complement of the upper definite description is “circle in the square”,
while the complement of the lower definite description is “square”. In the absence
of movement and intermediate accommodation, the two instances of “the” would be
translated as ι operators that apply to the denotations of their syntactic complements.
In (17), the ι operator that corresponds to the lower definite description takes as its ar-
gument the formula (18), which corresponds to the words “square” and “in”. Of these,
the word “in” is not contained in the complement of the lower “the”. The question why
the lower “the” should be able to take a semantic argument that is not exclusively de-
noted by its syntactic complement is not addressed by van Eijck (1993). We regard this
question as the core of Haddock’s puzzle.
(18) square(v2) ; in(v1, v2)
3.3 Meier (2003)
Meier (2003) is the only formal semantic work entirely devoted to embedded definites
prior to this article. Meier argues that in a sentence like The circle in the square is white,
the inner definite the square introduces no presupposition of its own, and that this is so
because it is in a predicative rather than quantificational position (Partee, 1987). Meier
notes that definites in predicative positions fail to license anaphora, as shown by the
contrast between the predicative definite in (19a) and the non-predicative one in (19b):
(19) a. De Gaulle wasn’t the greatest French soldieri . #Hei was Napoleon.
b. De Gaulle didn’t meet the greatest French soldieri . Hei was already dead.
Observing that the embedded definites in (20) fail to license anaphora, she concludes
that they are also in predicative position.
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(20) a. The rabbit in the hati was grey. #Iti was black.
b. The lady with the dogi is a princess. #Iti is extremely big.
Meier observes that Haddock’s puzzle does not arise with relational nouns. Specifically,
she reports that “The destruction of the city occurred at midnight” is odd if there are
two cities, of which one was destroyed, and a small village was also destroyed. She
observes that the examples in (21), which are built around relational nouns, license
anaphora, in contrast to the examples in (20).
(21) a. The encounter with the beari was terrifying. Iti was extremely big.
b. The journalist’s booki appeared in 1993. He wrote iti on a train.
Meier therefore assumes that definites embedded by a nonrelational noun have a sep-
arate lexical entry (thepr ed ) than other definites (ther e f ). She postulates the syntax and
lexical entries shown in Fig. 7.
NP
ther e f N’
circle
P
in thepr ed
square
Word Translation
ther e f λR : [∃!x R(x)]. [ιx R(x)]
circle λx.circle(x)
in λD〈et ,et〉.λP〈et〉.λQ〈et〉.λx.Q(x)∧ [∃y D(λz.in(x, z)∧P (z))(y)]
thepr ed λP.λx.P (x) ∧ [∀y P (y)→ x = y]
square λx.square(x)
Figure 7: Meier (2003).
From these entries, we obtain the prediction that the meaning of the N’ constituent
circle in the square is as follows:
(22) λx[circle(x) ∧ [∃y in(x, y)∧square(y) ∧ [∀y ′ (in(x, y ′) ∧ square(y ′))→ y = y ′]]]
This predicate is true of any circle that is contained in exactly one square. The predicate
is defined on all entities, that is, it does not introduce any presuppositions. Assuming
that the outer definite presupposes that this predicate applies to exactly one entity, a
sentence like (9), The circle in the square is white, is predicted to presuppose that the
number of circles that are contained in exactly one square is exactly one.
We see problems both with the syntactic and with the semantic claims of this ac-
count. As illustrated in Fig. 7, the account in Meier (2003) starts from the assumption
that the words “in” and “the” form a syntactic constituent. This requires her to for-
mulate needlessly complicated lexical entries for these words. Meier adduces German
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contraction phenomena, such as in + dem = im, as evidence for this nonstandard syn-
tax. While German determiner contraction is indeed sensitive to the properties of the
definite determiner (it is only licensed when the determiner is not anaphoric, as shown
by Schwarz 2009), this in itself does not constitute evidence for the constituent struc-
ture proposed. It is well known that phonological contraction can happen across con-
stituent boundaries, so contraction does not constitute evidence for a nonstandard
constituent structure. For example, wanna- or to-contraction (Chomsky and Lasnik,
1977; Postal and Pullum, 1982) is possible across constituent boundaries, and in fact
even across NP traces (23a) and PRO (23b).
(23) a. I’m [ going [ to stay ]]. → Ii ’m [ gon- [ ti -na stay]].
b. I want [ PRO [ to stay]]. → I wanna stay. (Boeckx, 2000)
Moreover, the extraction tests in (24) are compatible with the standard constituent
structure and not with the one proposed by Meier. We conclude that the standard con-
stituent structure is the correct one.
(24) a. [What ]1 is the circle in t1?
b. *[What ]1 is the circle in the t1?
Turning to the semantic claims of Meier (2003), we doubt that the inner definite fails to
introduce any presuppositions, and we also doubt that (22) is the correct denotation of
the N’ constituent. In essence, Meier’s account predicts that the N’ constituent “circle
in the square” means “circle in exactly one square”. But the two are clearly different in
meaning and felicity conditions, as shown in the following minimal pair:
(25) a. Every circle in the square is white.
b. Every circle in exactly one square is white.
Sentence (25a) has a presupposition that is absent from sentence (25b), namely, that
there is exactly one square in total. Clearly, this presupposition is introduced by the
embedded definite. Moreover, for (25a) to be true, there has to be a square that con-
tains every circle. In contrast, (25b) is also compatible with a scenario in which differ-
ent circles are contained in different squares, as long as no white circle is contained in
more than one square.12
Finally, we disagree with the factual claim that motivated Meier’s proposal, namely
that definites embedded under nonrelational nouns fail to license anaphora. This was
supposed to be shown by her examples in (20) above, in contrast to the examples with
relational nouns in (21). However, this contrast is not a minimal pair. The examples
in (21) contain several factors absent from (20) that make it easier for the hearer to
establish the anaphoric link in question. First, in (21), selectional restrictions help
the hearer quickly rule out coindexings other than the one in question. For example,
both rabbits and hats can be black (20a), but only bears and not encounters can be big
12We also doubt that an embedded definite like the circle in the square presupposes that the number
of circles that are contained in exactly (rather than at least) one square is exactly one, as Meier predicts.
Her presupposition is satisfied in a scenario where one circle is contained in one square, and another
circle is contained in two (nested) squares. It seems that the noun phrase the circle in the square fails to
refer in such a scenario. This objection is similar to one that is faced by our own account, see fn. 9.
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(21a). Second, the examples are not equivalent from the point of discourse coherence
(Mann and Thompson, 1988): Intuitively, the discourses (21a) and (21b) are coherent
because the second sentence elaborates on the first; the discourses in (20a) are less
coherent because the second sentence stands in contrast to the first or introduces an
unrelated fact. It is known that discourse coherence affects anaphoric links across sen-
tences (Kehler, 2002), especially when the potential antecedent is embedded under a
quantificational element (Wang et al., 2006).13 We conjecture that absence of selec-
tional restrictions and low discourse coherence contribute to the degraded status of
the examples in (20). Once these factors are controlled for, anaphoric reference to an
embedded definite is possible:
(26) The rabbit in the hati was satisfied. Iti was much roomier and more comfort-
able than the other hats.
This example differs from (20a) in its tighter selectional restrictions (a rabbit can be
black, but it cannot be roomy) and in its higher discourse coherence: the second sen-
tence elaborates on the first, rather than standing in contrast to it.
Summing up this section, we conclude that none of the previous accounts of the
phenomenon of embedded definites is satisfactory.14 In the remainder of the paper,
we consider a prediction that is inherent in our movement-based proposal and that
provides further evidence to distinguish between the accounts.
4 The Locality Prediction
In this section, we introduce a prediction that sets apart our analysis from the other
proposals summarized in the previous section. Since the prediction arises from syn-
tactic locality conditions that affect QR, we will refer to it as the Locality Prediction.
This prediction is not shared by accounts like those mentioned in the previous section,
because neither of them relates Haddock’s problem to scope shifting processes. In this
section, we first introduce the relevant constraints on QR that give rise to the locality
prediction. We then spell out in detail how the prediction is derived. The locality pre-
diction then arises from the interaction of the constraints on QR and principles that
determine the choice between definite and indefinite determiners. As we argue, the
prediction is expected to be subtle in relevant examples. For this reason, we set aside
the empirical test of the prediction for Sect. 5. The goal of this section is only to show
how the locality prediction arises from the premises of our account.
Since Rodman (1976), it has been known that scope shifting processes are subject to
locality restrictions. In fact, cases of the type Rodman discussed are directly relevant for
our problem since they concern a constraint on inverse linking. Specifically, Rodman
13Psycholinguistic factors also militate against anaphoric reference to an embedded definite. For ex-
ample, the preference for resolving pronouns to subjects arguably favors the embedding definite over
the embedded one, as does the preference for resolving pronouns to the first mentioned antecedent in
the sentence (e.g. Frederiksen, 1981; Gernsbacher and Hargreaves, 1988).
14Chris Piñón (p.c.) points out that quantification over pairs is a further intuition one might try to
pursue. The idea would be to interpret the circle in the square as something paraphrasable as ‘the x of
the pair (x, y) such that x is a circle in y and y is a square’. While the intuition is clear, an account along
these lines would also require independent motivation of all the assumptions it relies on.
42 Lucas Champollion and Uli Sauerland
observed that inverse linking is degraded or impossible in subject relatives containing
an object quantifier. The examples in (27) and (28) illustrate this constraint: In both
cases, inverse linking is possible in example a, and the examples are chosen in such a
way that the inverse linking interpretation is pragmatically preferred. The b-examples,
on the other hand, do not permit an inversely linked interpretation. Because inverse
scope is not available, only a surface scope interpretation is easily available. The two
b-examples are pragmatically odd because the surface scope interpretation conflicts
with our world knowledge.
(27) a. An apple in every basket is rotten.
b. #An apple that is in every basket is rotten.
(28) a. The wife of every soldier attended the ceremony.
b. #The woman who married every soldier attended the ceremony.
The relevant syntactic configuration is a difference of locality. In both (27a) and (28a),
the universal quantifier is embedded in a PP that is either adjoined or an argument
of the head noun of the outer DP. In (27b) and (28b), on the other hand, the univer-
sal quantifier is the object of a relative clause that is attached to the head noun of the
outer DP. Rodman’s generalization is that the object of a relative clause cannot take
scope over the DP that the relative clause is attached to.15 Assuming QR as the scope
shifting process, Rodman’s generalization is captured as a syntactic constraint on the
application of QR. In syntactic terminology, such a restriction is referred to as an Is-
land Effect (Ross, 1968). Specifically, the effect in (27) and (28) can be described as the
following: Subject relative clauses are islands for QR of the object.
The investigation of island effects in syntax is an area of active research (see e.g.
Cecchetto 2004). However, as far as we can see, the issues that are under debate do not
affect our locality prediction. For the locality prediction to arise, it is sufficient if there
is a consistent effect of syntactic configuration on the applicability of QR. This is widely
accepted by current research in the field. One current discussion is important for the
predicted strength of the effect due to locality: A number of researchers have found
that, in many cases, island phenomena are gradient effects rather than all or nothing.
Specifically, Snyder (2000) shows satiation effects for some island effects in English.
Furthermore, islands vary across languages. Rizzi (1982) and, more specifically, Eng-
dahl (1997) argue that subject relative clauses in Swedish are not islands for some types
of overt movement.16 Though these studies did not look directly at QR, but instead at
instances of overt movement, the results lead us to expect that the effect of locality on
QR also may be gradient, and therefore more difficult to detect. This is indeed what we
found. For this reason, we demonstrate our prediction by a large-scale survey.
The examples in (29) illustrate the locality prediction entailed by our analysis. (29a)
was discussed in Section 2 above. Recall that part of our account of (29a) was QR of the
definite description the square to a position with clausal scope. In (29b), however, the
definite the square occurs inside of a subject relative clause. As in the examples above,
we expect the subject relative clause to make QR of the definite description more diffi-
15The subject of a relative clause can, at least in some cases, take scope above the outer DP that the
relative clause is attached to (see for example Hulsey and Sauerland 2006).
16Engdahl attributes the original observation to Andersson (1974) and Allwood (1976).
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cult in (29b) than it is in (29a).
(29) a. The circle in the square is white.
b. #The circle that is in the square is white.
While some native speakers perceive the predicted contrast in (29), others describe
both examples as perfect. Our experimental evidence in the next section shows that
there is indeed a contrast between the two sentences in (29) in the expected direction.
However, it would not be suitable for an experiment to directly compare the relative
acceptability of (29a) and (29b), since (29b) is longer and may therefore be perceived
to be more difficult and less acceptable than (29a).
In the experiment, we instead compare definite with indefinite descriptions. The
experiment then tests the interaction of the locality prediction with the pragmatic li-
censing of definite and indefinite determiners. The basic principle we assume for
the licensing of the indefinite determiners is described by Hawkins (1981) and Heim
(1991). Since Heim’s version ties into the theoretical assumptions about presupposi-
tions that we assume, we follow her account in the following. Heim’s account is based
on the general principle of Maximize Presupposition (see also Sauerland 2008). The ef-
fect of this principle is that the presupposition-less indefinite determiner is blocked in
case the presupposition of a definite determiner is satisfied in the same position. The
principle is motivated by the complementary distribution of definite and indefinite
determiners in examples like (30):
(30) a. The capital of France is pretty.
b. #A capital of France is pretty.
In examples like (29), the prediction of Heim’s proposal is more intricate because Max-
imize Presupposition is predicted to interact with the possibility of QR, though Heim
does not discuss this possibility. Consider the indefinite version of (29) in (31). We
assume that the indefinite is licensed only if replacing it with a definite in the same
logical form representation would lead to a presupposition failure. That is, Maximize
Presupposition does not compare representations in which QR has applied with repre-
sentations in which it has not applied. As we have seen in Sect. 2, our proposal entails
that in the scenario represented by Fig. 1, the presupposition of the definite can be ful-
filled only in a logical form representation where it has undergone QR. The prediction
for (31a) depends therefore on whether QR of the indefinite a square to a clausal po-
sition is optional or obligatory. We assume that it is optional because we have found
no empirical difference in acceptability between (29a) and (31a) in pilot testing that we
have done so far.17 If QR is optional, two logical form representations are predicted to
be generated for (31a): one where the indefinite takes clausal scope and a second one
where it remains in situ. In the former, the indefinite determiner could be replaced
with a definite determiner without causing a presupposition failure, and therefore the
indefinite should be blocked by Maximize Presupposition. In the latter representation,
however, the same replacement would lead to a presupposition failure since it would
17Higginbotham (2006) reports relevant introspective judgments where the indefinite version is un-
grammatical, while the definite is not. Therefore it seems possible that our pilot testing on this matter
was not sensitive enough to detect the difference.
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result in the structure shown in Fig. 4. So (31a) is predicted to be acceptable: Maximize
Presupposition does not rule it out.
(31) a. The circle in a square is white.
b. The circle that is in a square is white.
In the case of (31b), the prediction of our account is more straightforward because QR
to a position outside of the relative clause is discouraged by the island effect. Replac-
ing the indefinite with a definite determiner is predicted to lead to a presupposition
failure on any representation of (31b) that does not violate the island. In this way, the
indefinite determiner is expected to be licensed as well.
In sum, our account makes a novel locality prediction. Specifically, there should
be a greater contrast in acceptability between (29b) and (31b) than between (29a) and
(31a). This prediction sets apart our account from the previous accounts discussed in
Sect. 3. The experiment described in the following section confirms that the locality
prediction is indeed correct.
5 Experiment
To test the locality prediction described in the previous section, we conducted an on-
line experiment. We used the online marketplace Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk,
www.mturk.com) to design and conduct the study and to recruit and pay subjects. We
chose this method over others because it allowed us to test a large number of subjects
in a convenient and low cost manner.
The experiment was designed to directly compare definite and indefinite versions
of the two critical sentences. We created a three-part questionnaire that is reproduced
in the Appendix. The first part asked for demographic information including the par-
ticipants’ gender, native language, country of residence, and year of birth. The second
part consisted of instructions, a picture, and four test sentences. The picture was the
one in Fig. 1 above. The sentences each contained a drop-down box presenting both
an definite and an indefinite determiner. The subjects were instructed that the test
sentences were intended as descriptions of the picture, and that they should in each
case choose the determiner that fits best and sounds most natural. The third part of
the questionnaire gave the participants an opportunity to provide us with feedback.
There were four versions of the questionnaire, which differed only with respect to
the experimental items. In each case, the experimental item was the third of the sen-
tences presented. The other three sentences acted as distractors and did not differ
across versions of the questionnaire.18 The two experimental items are shown here:
18For technical reasons, it was impossible to randomize the order of the sentences or of the items in
the drop-down boxes. To simulate the latter, half of the questionnaires contained drop-down boxes with
a definite as the topmost item, and the other half had an indefinite as the topmost item.
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No-island condition: The circle in
Select
the
a
square is white.
Island condition: The circle that is in
Select
the
a
square is white.
In the experiment, the participants were asked to choose one of the determiners from
the drop-down box. This choice was recorded by the MTurk system and we used the
summary report provided by the MTurk system for our data analysis.
A total of 1200 participants participated in the survey at a total cost of about $38
(about 3 cent per answer). We decided not to restrict the survey to native speakers,
because this might have encouraged MTurk workers interested in participating to lie
about their native language. Instead, we subsequently filtered the results and kept
only native speakers who grew up and now live in the US by their own report in the
demographic part of our survey. We furthermore removed repeat participants and in-
complete answers, leaving us with data from 797 participants.
Overall, the result confirms the locality prediction made by our account. In report-
ing our results, we added the results from the two items that differed only with respect
to the order of presentation of the two determiners in the drop-down box. Thus sum-
marized, the result of the experiment is the following for the condition without island:
The circle in
the 85.5% (N = 336)
a 14.5% (N = 57)
square is white.
For the condition with an island, we obtained the following result:
The circle that is in
the 76.2% (N = 308)
a 23.8% (N = 96)
square is white.
As shown, subjects chose the definite determiner more frequently in the condition
without an island than in the condition with an island. The chi-square test shows that
the effect is significant (χ2 = 11.0088 (1 degree of freedom); p< 0.001). We interpret this
effect as indicating that subjects are indeed sensitive to an island effect of the subject
relative clause when it comes to licensing the definite determiner the. Even in the sec-
ond condition, where the relevant determiner occurs inside of an island, still more than
75% of subjects preferred the definite determiner over the indefinite. We interpret this
fact as indicating that the island effect of the subject relative clause is relatively weak.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a solution to what we call Haddock’s puzzle: the prob-
lem of accounting for the unexpectedly weak presuppositions of definite descriptions
that are embedded in other definite descriptions (Haddock, 1987).
Our solution to Haddock’s puzzle, described in detail in Sect. 2, relies entirely on in-
dependently motivated assumptions: namely, that definite descriptions can undergo
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scope shifting operations in the same way quantificational noun phrases do, and that
intermediate accommodation can move presuppositions from the sister node of such
a noun phrase into its denotation. Applied to the example the circle in the square, we
assume that the definite the square can move to a position where its sister node is the
definite the circle in t1, with t1 a variable bound by the square. In this configuration, the
sister node of the square presupposes that there is a unique item that (i) is a circle and
(ii) contains that square. When this presupposition is accommodated into the square,
this definite is restricted to squares that are contained by a circle.
To the best of our knowledge, our account is the first solution to Haddock’s puz-
zle that is derived entirely from independently established assumptions. Furthermore,
our proposal makes a novel locality prediction (Sect. 4) that sets it apart from other
approaches to the puzzle. The prediction stems from the role played by QR in our
account. Like other movement operations, QR is known to be degraded in island en-
vironments, so our account predicts that the presupposition-weakening effect should
be less clearly observable in embedded definites that are separated by an island. As
reported in Sect. 5, we tested this prediction experimentally by using a subject rela-
tive clause as an island environment. We found that in a context that satisfies only the
weaker presupposition, participants asked to choose between a definite and an indef-
inite were indeed less likely to insert a definite into the island environment the circle
that is in __ square than into the control environment the circle in __ square. However,
this island must be characterized as weak, because participants still inserted a definite
more often than an indefinite, even though they had to violate the island to do so.
While some of our readers might perhaps have expected a more dramatic confir-
mation of our locality prediction, the weakness of the observed island effect is in fact
expected, because independent research has established the weakness of island effects
in general (see Sect. 4). The explanandum is therefore not the weakness of the observed
effect, but its presence, for which previous accounts do not provide an explanation.
Our proposal has at least one broader implication. Specifically, it relies on the as-
sumption that definite descriptions can undergo QR or other scope shifting operations.
QR of definites has been controversially discussed and evidence for it is hard to come
by, since definites generally do not exhibit scope ambiguities with other quantifiers
(Isac, 2006). Our findings support the view that definite descriptions are not always
interpreted in situ. However, it is important to note that definite descriptions may
be conceived of as undergoing QR regardless of their type (Glanzberg, 2007). So our
findings do not conclusively show that they have the type of quantifiers and do not
resolve the old debate between referential (Frege, 1892; Strawson, 1950; Kaplan, 1972)
and quantificational (Russell, 1905; Barwise and Cooper, 1981; Neale, 1990; Isac, 2006)
accounts of definites. Moreover, to account for our experimental finding that definites
and indefinites are not in complementary distribution, we have assumed that QR of
definites is optional. This is compatible with the position that definites are of quan-
tificational type only if type mismatches of nonsubject definites can be resolved by
strategies other than QR, such as type-shifting (Heim and Kratzer, 1998).
Finally, there is one additional facet of Haddock’s puzzle to which our account does
not directly extend. Namely, Meier (2003) observes that Haddock’s puzzle does not
arise with relational nouns. Within the account that we provided, Meier’s observation
would follow if either relational nouns created islands for QR of their complements or
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if the presupposition of a relational definite could not be accommodated in intermedi-
ate positions. At present, we have no solid evidence to decide whether either of these
possible accounts of Meier’s effect is correct, and we leave the matter up to future work.
Appendix: Experimental Materials
Demographic Questions:
1. Are you male or female? [Choices offered: male/female]
2. What year where you born in?
3. What is/are your native language or languages?
4. In which country have you spent the majority of your life from birth till age ten?
5. Are you left-handed or is one of your blood-relatives (father, mother, brothers,
sisters, grandparents, aunts, uncles) left-handed? [Choices offered: I am right-
handed, and so are all my blood-relatives. / I myself or at least one of my blood-
relatives is left-handed.]
Complete Instructions:
1. Below, we show you a picture and a few sentences. Each sentence is meant to
describe some part of the picture.
2. In each sentence a word is replaced by a dropdown menu. Please select the word
that fits best into the sentence, keeping in mind that it should be accurate and
sound natural.
3. Please answer according to your own feeling for the language. We’re interested
in natural everyday English, i.e. in what you feel sounds right, not in what other
people have taught you about it.
4. We’re interested in your spontaneous reactions. If you can’t decide, go with your
first reaction. Once you’ve completed this HIT [Human Intelligence Task – a term
which refers to this questionnaire in the context of MTurk], please submit it right
away. Do not go back over it to change your answers.
[The following are three fillers and a test sentence, where the material in parentheses
stands for drop-down menus implementing the forced-choice condition:]
1. The grey circle is (between/left of) two squares.
2. The big square that contains the triangle is (on/to) the right.
3. [four different versions of the test sentence as discussed in the text]
4. The big squares are (grey/black).
Text used in part three of the survey:
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1. OK, you’re almost done. We’re very interested in any comments on this HIT you
might have. Please leave some comments for us:
2. Important: We will only accept one HIT per worker. Please do not submit addi-
tional HITs like this one, or you might not get paid for any of them.
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